This paper solves a realistically calibrated life-cycle model of consumption and portfolio choice with uninsurable labor income risk and borrowing constraints. Since labor income substitutes for riskless asset holdings the optimal share invested in equities is roughly decreasing over life. We compute a measure of the importance of non-tradable human capital for investment behavior to find that ignoring labor income generates large utility costs, while the cost of ignoring only its risk is an order of magnitude smaller. We also quantify the utility cost associated with typical heuristics advocated by financial advisors.
Introduction
The issue of portfolio choice over the life-cycle is encountered by every investor. Popular finance books (e.g. Malkiel, 1996) and financial counselors generally give the advice to shift the portfolio composition towards relatively safe assets, such as T-bills, and away from risky stocks as the investor grows older and reaches retirement. But what could be the economic justification for doing so?
A seminal reference addressing the problem of portfolio choice over the life-cycle is Samuelson (1969) . The concept of 'businessman's risk' (i.e. holding risky stocks is only advisable for young businessmen, not for widows) is explored and rejected as invalid. However this conclusion is reached under the assumptions of independently and identically distributed returns and requires frictionless markets and the absence of labor income.
It is intuitive that the length of an investor's horizon matters when facing asset returns that exhibit mean-reversion (Samuelson, (1991) ). A large literature has emerged exploring the hedging demands resulting from time-variation in excess returns and in interest rates (see Campbell (2000) for a survey of this literature). The hedging demands analyzed in this literature can generate the type of horizon effects that could rationalize the popular advice.
Another crucial element one needs to consider when discussing portfolio choice over the life-cycle is labor income and the risk associated with it. To the extent that the level and risk of the labor income stream change over the life-cycle, and to the extent that portfolio choice depends on these factors, the presence of labor income can provide a rationale for agevarying investment strategies, without relying on predictability in asset returns. Moreover, labor income or human capital is undoubtedly a crucial asset for the bulk of the population. This is the route we explore in this paper.
Of course, if markets are complete so that labor income can be capitalized and its risk insured, the introduction of labor income is well understood analytically from the seminal work by Merton (1971) . However, market-incompleteness seems to be an important feature to consider when analyzing portfolio choice in a quantitatively focussed study. Because of moral hazard issues, many investors face borrowing constraints that prevent them from capitalizing future labor income. Moreover, explicit insurance markets for labor income risk are not welldeveloped so that many investors face uninsurable labor income risk.
We solve numerically for the optimal portfolio and savings decisions using a realistically and quantitatively calibrated model. We consider a finitely-lived investor facing mortality risk, borrowing and short-sale constraints, and receiving labor income. The labor income profile and its risk characteristics are estimated using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), the largest longitudinal U.S. dataset containing careful information on labor income and individual control variables. The agent can invest her savings in two assets: a riskless and a risky asset, the return to which may be positively correlated with labor income shocks.
2 One can also think of our model as extending the recent consumption literature on buffer-stock saving (Deaton, 1991 , Carroll, 1997 and Gourinchas and Parker, 2000 to include an asset allocation decision.
In order to understand the effects of labor income risk on portfolio allocation, it is important to have in mind that a labor income stream constitutes the implicit holding of an asset. The crucial question is whether these implicit asset holdings are perceived as a closer substitute for riskfree asset holdings rather than for risky asset holdings. By examining the policy rules giving the optimal share of the portfolio allocated to the risky asset, we show that labor income acts as a substitute for riskfree asset holdings, if the correlation between labor income risk and stock market risk is set at the (insignificantly positive) value we estimated.
These results are conform earlier results obtained by Heaton and Lucas in an infinite-horizon setting (1997) and follow the intuition presented in Jagannathan and Kocherlakota (1996) .
In our model the shape of the labor income profile over life induces the investor to reduce her proportional stock holdings when aging, and thus provides a rationale for the advice given in the popular financial literature. The implicit riskfree-asset holdings under the form of labor income lose importance as the investor ages leading her to hold more riskfree assets explicitly,
i.e. in her financial portfolio. All else equal, investors subject to more labor income risk hold a smaller share of their portfolio in equities so that labor income risk crowds out asset-holding risk. is positively correlated with the return on stocks. 3 This extends to a life-cycle setting the results from the static theoretical literature on background risk (Pratt and Zeckhauser (1987) , Kimball (1993) , Gollier and Pratt (1996) ).
In order to assess the importance of non-tradable labor income and its risk for portfolio decisions we compute the utility cost (measured in consumption equivalent units) associated with suboptimal portfolio decisions. In particular we compute the utility loss incurred by investors who ignore their labor income and invest a constant fraction of wealth in equities, as would be optimal in the complete-markets, no labor income situation. The losses are substantial, and up to 2% of annual consumption. However, the loss resulting from behavior that only ignores the risk features of the labor income stream, is an order of magnitude smaller than the penalty for ignoring labor income altogether (at most 0.4%). We interpret this as evidence that labor income risk that is uncorrelated with stock returns (as faced by most investors in our sample) is not of first-order importance for portfolio decisions.
Finally, we analyze the consumption cost of investing according to a rule of thumb advertized by Malkiel (1996) , recommending investors to hold a percentage share in the riskless asset equal to their age. The cost ranges from 0.3% to 1.5% of annual consumption. This can be interpreted as the retirement effect in our model.
There are several papers which study the effects of labor income risk on portfolio composition. 4 Heaton and Lucas (1997), Koo (1998) and Viceira (2001) consider infinite-horizon models of portfolio choice with uninsurable labor income risk. Viceira (2001) captures retirement effects through a constant probability of zero labor income forever. By their stationary nature, infinite-horizon models are less suited to address life-cycle issues. More precisely, one of our findings is that an important determinant of portfolio composition is the ratio of accumulated wealth to expected future labor income, which is clearly not stationary over the life-cycle.
Bertaut and Haliassos (1997), Davis and Willen (2000) , Gakidis (1999) , Dammon, Spatt and Zhang (2001) consider finite horizon models and to this extent are closer to our paper.
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The main contribution of our paper is to solve a realistically calibrated life-cycle model of consumption and portfolio choice with uninsurable labor income risk, which allows us to obtain a measure of the importance of markets-incompleteness and labor income risk for investment behavior. Moreover, we quantify the utility cost associated with alternative portfolio rules, for realistic heterogeneity in investors.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the model's assumptions and set-up. The calibration and parametrization is presented in section 3. Section 4 looks at the solution of our model in terms of the optimal portfolio and consumption rules. Section 5 gives the simulation results for the benchmark parametrization and explores the effects of heterogeneity in labor income. The utility cost computations for several alternative investment strategies are reported in section 6. Finally, section 7 concludes.
2 The Model 2.1 Model Specification
Time parameters and preferences
We let t denote adult age. The investor is adult for a maximum of T periods, of which he works the first K. For simplicity K is assumed to be exogenous and deterministic. We allow for uncertainty in T in the manner of Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1995) . Let p t denote the probability that the investor is alive at date t + 1, conditional on being alive at date t.
Of course, p 0 ≡ 1. Then, investor i's preferences are described by the time-separable power utility function:
where C it is the level of date t consumption, γ > 0 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and δ < 1 is the discount factor. We assume that the individual derives no utility from leaving 5 Constantinides, Donaldson and Mehra (1999) and Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2000) explore the asset pricing implications of these models. a bequest. 
The labor income process
Before retirement, investor i's age t labor income, Y it , is exogenously given by:
where f (t, Z it ) is a deterministic function of age and of a vector of other individual characteristics Z it , ε it is an idiosyncratic temporary shock distributed as N(0, σ 2 ε ), and v it is given by
where u it is distributed as N(0, σ 2 u ) and is uncorrelated with ε it . Thus before retirement, log income is the sum of a deterministic component that can be calibrated to capture the hump shape of earnings over the life cycle, and two random components, one transitory and one persistent. The process for v t is taken be a random walk, following Carroll (1997) and Gourinchas and Parker (2000) . Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1995) estimate a general firstorder autoregressive process and find the autocorrelation coefficient to be very close to one.
We assume that the temporary shock ε it is uncorrelated across households, but we decompose the permanent shock u it into an aggregate component ξ t (distributed as N(0, σ 2 ξ ) and an idiosyncratic component ω it (distributed as N (0, σ 2 ω )):
This decomposition implies that the random component of aggregate labor income follows a random walk, an assumption made in the finance literature by Fama and Schwert (1977) and Jagannathan and Wang (1996) . At the same time, empirical time series for individual labor income exhibit less persistence and this is achieved by adding the idiosyncratic transitory shock ε it . Finally, we will allow for correlation between innovations to excess stock returns and labor income shocks through the aggregate component ξ t , as will be described in the next section. 6 It is straightforward to extend our analysis to incorporate bequest motives if we take the utility of terminal wealth to be additively separable.
The assumption that labor income is exogenous is made primarily for simplicity. In reality individuals must decide how many hours to work and how much effort to put on the job, decisions that will influence the amount of labor income received. In particular, by having exogenous labor income we rule out the possibility that an individual who has had a bad portfolio return (or labor income) realization works more hours to compensate for it.
7
Retirement income is modelled as a constant fraction λ of permanent labor income in the last working-year:
Although oversimplified, this specification considerably facilitates the solution of the model, as it does not require the introduction of an additional state variable.
Financial assets
We assume that there are two assets in which the agent can invest, a riskless and a risky assets. The riskless asset, which we call Treasury bills, has a constant gross real return of R f .
We denote the dollar amount of T-bills the investor has at time t by B it . The risky asset has a gross real return R t , and its excess return is given by:
where η t+1 , the period t + 1 innovation to excess returns, is assumed to be i.i.d. over time and distributed as N (0, σ 2 η )We allow innovations to excess returns to be correlated with innovations to the aggregate component of permanent labor income, and we write the correlation coefficient as ρ. We call the risky asset stocks and denote the dollar amount the investor has in stocks at time t by S it .
We assume that the investor faces the following borrowing and short-sales constraints:
S it ≥ 0.
The borrowing constraint (7) ensures that the investor's allocation to bills is non-negative at all dates. It prevents the investor from capitalizing or borrowing against future labor income or retirement wealth. The short-sales constraint (8) ensures that the investor's allocation to equities is non-negative at all dates.
These constraints can be motivated using the standard moral hazard and adverse selection arguments. It is straightforward to allow for a negative limit in (7) or (8) . What is important for our results is that the individual is to some extent liquidity constrained in the early years of his adult life. We believe that this is the case for most households.
The investor's optimization problem
In each period t the timing of the events is as follows. The investor starts the period with wealth W it . Then labor income Y it is realized. Following Deaton (1991) we denote cash-onhand in period t by X it = W it + Y it . We will also refer to X it as wealth: it is understood that this includes labor income earned in period t. Then the investor must decide how much to consume, C it , and how to allocate the remaining cash-on-hand (savings) between stocks and T-bills. We denote the proportion of savings invested in stocks by α it . Next period wealth, before earning period t + 1's labor income, is then given by:
where R p t+1 is the return on the portfolio held from period t to period t + 1:
Constraints (7) and (8) then become:
The problem the investor faces is to maximize (1) subject to constraints (2) through (6), (9) through (11) , in addition to the non-negativity constraint on consumption. The control variables of the problem are {C it , α it } T t=1 . The state variables are {t,
. The problem is to solve for the policy rules as a function of the state variables, i.e., C it (X it , v it ) and α it (X it , v it ). Given the set-up we assumed, the value function is homogeneous with respect to current permanent labor income. 8 Exploiting this scaleability allows us to normalize v it to one and to reduce the dimensionality of the state space.
The Bellman equation for this problem is given by:
The problem cannot be solved analytically. We derive the policy functions numerically by discretizing the state-space and by using backward induction. More details on the numerical solution technique are given in the appendix A.
Calibration

Labor Income Process
We used the PSID to estimate equations (2) and (3) which give labor income as a function of age and other characteristics. In this section we will give a brief description of the sample selction and the estimation method. More details are given in appendix B.
We took a broad definition of labor income so as to implicitly allow for (potentially endogenous) ways of self-insuring against pure labor income risk. Therefore we defined labor income as total reported labor income plus unemployment compensation, workers compensation, social security, supplemental social security, other welfare, child support and total transfers (mainly help from relatives), all this for both head of household and if present his spouse.
The estimation controls for family-specific fixed effects. To control for education the sample was split in three groups: the observations without high school education, a second group with high school education but without a college degree, and finally college graduates. The reason for doing this is the well-established finding that age-profiles differ in shape across education groups (see e.g. Attanasio, 1995 and Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes, 1995) . For each education group we assume that the function f(t, Z it ) is additively separable in t and Z it . The vector Z it of personal characteristics other than age and the fixed household effect, includes marital status and household size.
9 Table 1 and Figure 1 report the results for the three education groups. The coefficients of the age dummies are clearly significant and the results match intuition and stylized facts (see Attanasio (1995) , Gourinchas and Parker (2000) and Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1995)).
We fitted a third-order polynomial to the age dummies to obtain the profiles for the numerical solution (see Table 2 and Figure 1 ). The replacement ratio λ used to determine the amount of retirement income, was calibrated as the ratio of the average of our labor income variable defined above for retirees in a given education group to the average of labor income in the last working-year prior to retirement. The result is also reported in Table 2 .
We estimate the error structure of the labor income process by following closely the variance decomposition method described by Carroll and Samwick (1997) . We use a similar procedure to estimate the correlation between labor income shocks and stock returns, ρ. The results are reported in Table 3 and (as mentioned above) the details are given in appendix B. Table 5 reports our benchmark parameter values. Adult age starts at age 20 for households without a college degree, and at age 22 for households with a college degree. The age of retirement is set to 65 for all households. The investor dies with probability one at age 100.
Other Parameters
Prior to this age we use the mortality tables of the National Center for Health Statistics to parameterize the conditional survival probabilities, p j for j = 1, ...T. We set the discount factor δ to 0.96, and the coefficient of relative risk aversion γ to 10. This is the upper bound 9 Ideally one should also control for occupation. Using PSID data this is problematic because from the 1975 wave onwards the majority of the unemployed report no occupation, and are categorized together with people who are not in the labor force. Obviously, modelling unemployment as a switch in occupation is not appropriate for our purposes as we believe that the possibility of getting laid off is one of the main sources of labor income risk.
for risk aversion considered reasonable by Mehra and Prescott (1985) . We also consider lower values.
The mean equity premium µ is 4.00% for the benchmark case but we will also consider 5.75% (the value observed in the data). 10 The risk-free rate is 2.00% and the standard deviation of innovations to the risky asset is set to its historical value of 0.157.
Policy Functions
Before looking at simulated life-cycle paths for consumption and portfolio choice, we discuss the policy functions underlying these results. This allows us to highlight the main forces at work and to gain intuition on the determinants of consumption and portfolio choice. All the results presented in this section are for the benchmark case of the second education group (see Table 4 for a summary of the parameters). The policy functions behave in a similar manner for the other parametrizations we consider, unless explicitly stated.
Let us start with the portfolio rules. In the complete-markets setting and ignoring labor income, the optimal portfolio rule for an investor with power utility facing a constant investment opportunity set is straightforward. As Samuelson (1969) and Merton (1969) showed, the optimal fraction of wealth invested in the risky asset is constant, independent of wealth and age, and depends only on risk aversion and the moments of the asset's excess return:
In a realistic life-cycle setting however, the agent is likely to earn risky labor income that cannot be capitalized. Moreover, borrowing constraints might prevent short-selling. The portfolio rule is no longer a constant and will be a function of the relevant state variables. We focus on the dependence of the portfolio rule on cash-on-hand or financial wealth and on age.
Graphically, we plot the portfolio rule giving the optimal fraction of the portfolio invested into the risky asset (α(X, t)), as a function of cash-on-hand X and for a given age t. Then we 10 As will be clear from the results, this conservative equity premium was chosen in combination with a high degree of risk aversion because the presence of (even risky) labor income substantially increases the demand for stocks.
consider how this rule shifts as the agent ages.
It is easiest to consider first the retirement stage. In this phase of the life-cycle, we model 'labor income' as being constant and certain. What is the effect of the presence of this certain but non-traded income stream on the portfolio decision? Figure 2a shows the optimal portfolio rule for year T − 1. This policy function is presented first because it solves a simple two-period problem, for which the intuition is well explained in Jagannathan and Kocherlakota (1996).
The optimal portfolio rule is decreasing in wealth. 11 This can be understood as follows.
During the last period, the investor receives a nonrandom amount of labor income. Clearly, this future retirement income acts as a substitute for risk-free asset holdings and induces the investor to hold more stocks. Also, the implicit risk-free asset position held in the form of non-traded retirement income is fixed and independent of the amount of wealth. The agent with little wealth will then tilt her financial portfolio more aggressively towards equities than the agent with a large amount of financial wealth, simply because the poorer investor already has a relatively larger risk-free asset position from her retirement income. That implies that the optimal fraction α of financial wealth allocated to stocks is decreasing in wealth. The asymptoting behavior of the portfolio rule follows from the same intuition: for very high values of cash-on-hand, retirement income becomes trivial and ceases to increase the agent's demand for equities. The proportional demand for stocks asymptotes to the complete-markets solution given by equation (12) , and shown by the straight line in Figure 2a .
Similar reasoning explains the behavior of the optimal investment strategy as a function of age during retirement. As the investor ages, the amount of future labor income (and of the risk-free asset holdings implict in it) relative to the amount of financial wealth to be invested changes, and this affects the optimal portfolio rule α. Of course, quantifying these relative measures is not as trivial as above, where the agent had only one more period to consider.
In the multi-period setting and assuming complete markets, the importance of the future retirement income stream can be measured by the capitalized or present discounted value
=t+1 , defined as:
where 1/(1 + r t ) is the appropriate (stochastic) discount factor. He and Pearson (1991) show that there exists no unique way to compute the annuity value of labor income in the incomplete-markets environment that is considered here. However, the intuition provided by the complete-markets setting will prove useful for the purpose of understanding our results. Recall Merton's solution (1971) for the portfolio problem considered here, when labor income is constant, markets are complete and time continuous:
It can easily be seen that
is the continuous-time equivalent of our P DV t (F Y t )
when both the discount rate r t and labor income Y t are constant. Therefore, (14) can be rewritten as:
Thus the fraction of total wealth, consisting of financial wealth W t and of human capital
, invested in the risky asset, equals the familiar ratio
. For a given value of W t , α then decreases as the horizon shrinks or as t approaches T . This reflects again the fact that retirement income represents implicit risk-free asset holdings. As the agent grows older, these holdings decrease, and for a given level of cash-on-hand the agent responds to this by holding a larger proportion of her financial portfolio in the riskless asset. This implies that the portfolio rule shifts inwards as one ages in retirement (Figure 2b ).
Before retirement, when the labor income stream is stochastic, three interesting lessons can be learned from the analysis of the portfolio rules. First, although it is not obvious that the risky labor income stream still mimics the payoff of a riskless asset more closely than the one of the risky asset, Figure 2b shows that this is the case since the policy function is still decreasing in cash-on-hand. This can be understood by noting that the labor income stream is not highly correlated with the innovations to stock returns. Indeed, it can be shown that the policy rules become increasing for low values of wealth (i.e. where a given labor income stream is large relative to wealth) if labor income shocks and stock return innovations are sufficiently positively correlated (Figure 2c ). Second, with respect to age effects, Figure 2b shows that the portfolio rules still become less aggressive as the middle-aged agent grows older. In addition to the obvious fall in the present value of future labor income due to the shortening of the income stream (as in the retirement phase of the model), the capitalized value of labor income also drops with age because of the negative slope of the labor income profile during this part of the life-cycle. The qualitative result from (14) therefore carries over to the more general setting of incomplete-markets and risky labor income.
A third interesting finding is that the steepness of the labor income stream early in life leads the agent to increase her demand for the risky asset as she ages, for a given amount of financial wealth. Graphically, the optimal investment strategy shifts out with age in Figure   2b , leading to a more aggressive relative equity position. This result is remarkable because it implies that present discounted value of future labor income, P DV t (F Y t ), must rise, not fall with age. What drives this is the fact that the earliest years are characterized by very low earnings and high earnings growth. Moreover, the stochastic discount factor is likely to be low (and the equilibrium discount rate r t high) early in life, given that the investor is liquidity constrained, as will be clear from the simulation results in the next section.
Another important ingredient to our understanding of the simulation results in the next section is the optimal consumption rule. Because the optimal portfolio weight in equities depends on the state variable wealth, the consumption-savings decision will determine where the portfolio rules identified above are evaluated. The consumption function, giving optimal consumption as a function of current cash-on-hand, is concave as derived analytically by Carroll and Kimball (1996) . In the first phase of the life-cycle (roughly until age 35 to 40, see Figure 2d ), the consumption function shifts upward as the agent ages. The reason is that her permanent income increases during this part of the life-cycle, due to the steep slope of the labor income profile. As households approach retirement and as their labor income profile becomes negatively sloped this pattern is reversed in Figure 2d .
To summarize: the consumption rules are in accordance with recent results in consumption theory. The portfolio rules on the other hand are substantially more complicated that in the complete-markets setting without labor income. However, the results obtained by Merton (1971) for the case of a riskless and constant income stream extend naturally. For a given age, the optimal fraction of the portfolio invested in equities is a decreasing function of wealth.
The intuition is that labor income, although risky, acts as a closer substitute to the riskfree asset than to equities. This rule becomes more aggressive very early in life and then shifts in throughout the rest of the life-cycle. This is driven by the shape of the estimated labor income profile.
Simulation Results
Using the policy functions derived above, we simulated the consumption and asset allocation profiles of 10000 agents over the life-cycle. Below we present and discuss the cross-sectional means of these simulated profiles. We start with the benchmark case for which we discussed the policy functions. Then we analyze the importance of heterogeneity in human capital for these benchmark results.
Benchmark Case
In Figure 3a the simulated income, wealth and consumption profiles are plotted. We see that households are liquidity constrained during, roughly, the first 15 years of their working lives. Consumption tracks income very closely and a small level of savings (around 6 months of labor income during the first decade) is accumulated to use as insurance-cushion against negative labor income shock. As labor income increases and when this profile becomes less steep the agent starts accumulating wealth for retirement. The consumption profile ceases to be increasing as the agent gets older, reflecting the fact that the liquidity constraint becomes less binding. Finally, during retirement effective impatience increases due to mortality risk and the consumption path slopes down, while wealth is decumulated at a fast rate. The standard hump-shaped consumption profile emerges.
In Figure 3b we present the mean simulated portfolio allocation. Early in life, most agents invest fully in stocks and hit the borrowing constraint. Only in the very first years of the life-cycle do some investors choose to hold the riskless asset. This is easily explained from the the behavior of the policy functions presented above: the very steep labor income profile shifts out the portfolio rule because the implicit riskless asset holdings represented by labor income increase rapidly initially. In midlife, saving for retirement becomes a crucial determinant of the agent's behavior. The downward-sloping portfolio rule is then evaluated at higher values of wealth so that the investor tilts her portfolio towards the riskfree asset. Finally, during retirement the portfolio rule shifts in. At the same time wealth is run down very quickly. The net effect is a slight increase in the optimal stock holdings due to the rapid pace at which the old agent decumulates wealth, motivated by mortality-enhanced effective impatience. This particular result might non be robust. For instance, enriching the model along the lines of Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1995) so as to allow for stochastic medical expenses and other uncertain events during retirement would likely slow down the pace at which wealth is being depleted.
This should be contrasted with the recommendation put forward by popular financial advisors to monotonically decrease the equity share over the life-cycle. Although the general pattern emerging from our dynamic program can be roughly characterized as similar, some subtle differences stand out. It is an interesting exercise to compute the utility costs of following this rule of thumb. This is an economically meaningful metric to gauge the importance of the differences between the two portfolio strategies. Before we turn to that however, we first consider some alternative parametrizations in order to address the robustness of the our results.
Heterogeneity
Not only is human capital a crucial asset for many investors, it is also characterized by substantial heterogeneity across investors. In particular, differences in the properties of labor income might have important implications for the optimal investment strategy. Different agents work in different sectors of the economy, and are therefore exposed to different amounts and different sorts of labor income risk. Also, as the estimation in section 3 shows, the shape of the income profile depends significantly on educational attainment. In this section we solve for the optimal portfolio and consumption rules for some of these cases in order to explore the importance of labor income heterogeneity for optimal investment strategies. Finally, we also analyze the sensitivity of our results to some crucial parameters as risk aversion and the equity premium.
Labor income risk
Depending on the sector or industry that the investor works in, the risk aspects of her labor income might differ substantially from the benchmark case analyzed before. Parameters of interest are the variance of the temporary and permanent shocks to labor income, σ 2 ε and σ 2 u respectively, and the correlation between the permanent shocks to labor income and the innovations to excess returns, ρ. To illustrate the effects, we will focus on some extreme cases as identified in Campbell, Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (1999). In particular, we solve the dynamic program for investors in industries with large standard deviations for permanent and temporary income shocks, i.e. with a lot of career and layoff risk respectively. Construction and especially Agriculture are sectors that yields large estimates for σ 2 ε and σ 2 u , but interestingly for both cases the ratio
is very similar to the one used in the benchmark analysis.
Public Administration on the other hand is characterized by a large value for
, but a total variance of shocks to labor income (σ
) that is about half the benchmark estimate. The parameters used in this section are summarized in Table 4 . Apart from these realistic parametrizations, we also solve the consumption-portfolio problem for a hypothetical investor subject to zero labor income risk. This exercise demonstrates the effect of 'normal' labor income risk, i.e. as faced by the typical highschool graduate.
Let us start with the problem for the investor facing no labor income risk. Relative to the benchmark, we expect two effects. First of all, the lack of any labor income risk eliminates the precautionary savings motive. Secondly, the intuition that labor income risk crowds out portfolio risk suggests that the fraction of the portfolio allocated to the risky asset should increase, for a given amount of financial wealth. It can be seen from Figure 4a that both effects are at work. Until age 33, the investor saves nothing so that α is not defined. After that, we find that the agent invests significantly more in the risky asset.
Investors in Agriculture on the other hand, never chooses to invest 100% in stocks. The outward shift in the portfolio rule discusses in the previous section shows up neatly and results in a roughly hump-shaped portfolio profile.
The agents in Construction and especially Public Administration have portfolio profiles that are very similar to the one obtained for the benchmark calibration. The difference in risk characteristics of their labor income is simply too small to yield any substantial effects.
Heaton and Lucas (1997) also report that realistic labor income uncertainty has only minor effects on portfolio choice in the context of their infinite-horizon model. This happens because agents obtain effective insulation from labor income shocks by simply accumulating enough wealth. This way investors self-insure by building up resources when labor income shocks are positive and by running down their assets in face of adverse shocks. It can be seen that the results carry over to the non-stationary finite-horizon environment we consider, even though it might not be obvious ex-ante that agents would achieve full self-insurance.
Educational Attainment
Figure 4b plots simulated labor income profiles, invested wealth and portfolio allocation over the life-cycle for the different education groups. It is important to have in mind that in our stylized model an education group is characterized solely by the age at which working life begins, a given labor income profile and the stochastic properties of the shocks to it (i.e. variance and correlation with return innovations). In particular, we ignore any informational costs of investing in stocks and how these might differ across education groups.
As Figure 4b shows, the share of savings invested in stocks is similar for all education groups. However, some interesting differences emerge. First, the maximum of the portfolio profile occurs much earlier in the life-cycle for education groups 1 and 2 than for education group 3. Remember the explanation for the increasing part of the investment profile in terms of portfolio rule shifts: the reason is the steepness of the labor income profile. As can be seen from Figure 1 the profile is especially steep for education group 3. In midlife, the share of savings invested in stocks is, for a given age, increasing in the level of education. For a given age, the importance of future labor income is increasing in the level of education (Figure 1) and this means that the implicit riskless asset holdings (in the form of future labor income) are higher for more educated households. Finally, around age 55, the profiles for investors with and without highschool degree cross. The reason for this phenomenon is the larger replacement ratio that characterizes the retirement income of education group 1. Investors in education group 2 have a relatively smaller implicit riskfree asset position when reaching retirement and tilt their financial portfolio more heavily towards the riskfree asset.
Equity Premium and Risk Aversion
The effect of decreasing risk aversion or of increasing the equity premium is presented in Figures 4c and 4d respectively. In a complete-markets setting without labor income, decreasing risk aversion by 50% has the same effect as doubling the equity premium: both would double the optimal portfolio share, as can be seen from (12) . In our incomplete-markets setting, this is no longer true. We find that lowering risk aversion has a larger effect than increasing the equity premium. This can be understood as follows. Lowering risk aversion affects not only the portfolio share directly as in (12) , but also lowers wealth accumulation. Less risk-averse investor accumulate less precautionary savings, raising α even more. This would lead one to expect a larger effect than in the case without labor income. However, the simulation results suggest that the effect is mitigated (Figure 4c ). The reason is that the investor we analyze faces short-sale and borrowing constraints. The fact that many investors are constrained explains the much smaller effect of changes in γ on the average portfolio share.
With respect to raising the equity premium, Figure 4d shows very small effects. The reason is that a higher equity premium leads to more wealth accumulation, not less as for a higher value of γ. This happens because wealth grows at a faster rate, and inspite of the fact that the savings rate in each period is actually smaller (for γ > 1, as we have, the income effcet dominates the substitution effect so that investors save less when facing a higher return on savings). Because wealth grows faster, the increase in α is smaller than in the case without labor income (risk). Finally, adding to that the mitigating effect of borrowing constraints as described above for a lower coefficient of relative risk aversion, yields the result as obtained.
6 Utility cost calculations
Alternative asset allocation rules
The optimal portfolio profiles obtained above are intuitive, but differ from the rules identified under the assumption of complete markets as in (12) or (14) and from the rules of thumb proposed by popular financial advisors. Most popular advisors suggest portfolio rules that allocate a lower fraction of the portfolio to stocks for older investors. For instance, an explicit heuristic given in Malkiel (1996, p. 418) suggests to invest a fraction in equities equal to 100 minus the investor's age:
Although our results could also roughly be characterized as involving a decreasing equity share over the life-cycle, the above heuristic (16) involves some simplifications that seem extreme from a theoretical viewpoint. It ignores crucial parameters such as risk aversion, equity premium and the variance of the innovations to returns. More subtlely, the heuristic is independent of either wealth or labor income, or any other individual-specific characteristics.
The economic importance of the suboptimality associated with (16) can easily be analyzed in our framework by computing the utility cost relative to the optimal rule. This is an economically meaningful metric to gauge the importance of the differences between two portfolio strategies. We can study under which conditions or for which agents the utility loss is likely to be most substantial. A similar analysis can be conducted for the optimal rules derived by Merton under the assumption of complete-markets and of no labor income, (12) .
The results can be suggestive about the joint importance of labor income and its risk characteristics for individual financial decision-making, of course within the assumptions of our incomplete-markets model. Furthermore, computing additionally the utility loss associated with (14) allows us to quantify the relevance of labor income risk and of market incompleteness for the portfolio decision. Comparing the welfare cost of following (14) )) and strong empirical evidence, it is also of interest to compute the welfare loss associated with a zero equity share. We first consider the utility cost in our benchmark case ( Figure 5 plots the life-cycle patterns for different rules
we study) and then analyze some of the cases we studied above in section 5.2 on heterogeneity.
The welfare calculations are done in the form of standard consumption-equivalent varia-tions: for each rule we compute the constant consumption stream that makes the investor as well-off in expected utility terms as the consumption stream that can be financed by the investment rule. Relative utility losses are then obtained by measuring the change in this equivalent consumption stream when deviating from the optimal rule towards the rule considered. More details are given in appendix C.
Results
Before analyzing the results, some explanation is in order with respect to how rule (14) is implemented in our model. Remember that equation (14) was derived under the assumption of complete markets, no mortality or labor income risk and a constant labor income stream. As was argued in section 4 the term
can be interpreted as the continuoustime equivalent of the present discounted value of future labor income when both the discount rate r t and labor income Y t are constant. We therefore use portfolio rule (15) as an operational version of the Merton rule. Moreover we assume that the agent ignores labor income risk and discounts future wages at the riskfree rate (appropriately adjusted for mortality risk). This is in the spirit of the motivation underlying the analysis conducted. We therefore compute the present discounted value of future labor income at each age and set the portfolio share invested in stocks equal to (15) . However, W appears in this formula and is a function of an endogenous state variable. The optimization with respect to consumption takes this interdependence into account. Also the current level of the permanent shock is included in the information set used by the investor, conform the timing assumption of the rest of the paper. Finally, the constraint that the portfolio share belong to the unit interval is also imposed on the rule (15) used in the subsequent exercise. Table 6 reports the results for these utility cost calculations.
For the benchmark parameters, rule (16) dominates (12), which in turn is preferred to nonparticipation in equity markets. The size of the welfare losses resulting from investing a constant share (i.e. ignoring labor income altogether) and especially from nonparticipation are substantial: even impatient, liquidity-constrained investors lose 1.5% and almost 2% of annual consumption respectively. The loss associated with the Malkiel heuristic is somewhat smaller but still quite substantial. Interestingly, the cost of following (14), i.e. of treating labor income as certain, is an order of magnitude smaller than the cost of ignoring labor income altogether and investing according to (12) . We can interpret this as saying that labor income itself is crucial for optimal portfolio decisions, not so much the typical risk associated with it.
These results also obtain for investor without highschool degree and for college graduates. Relative to the highschool graduates, investors with a college degree lose less from each suboptimal rule. This is surprising since college-graduates invest almost always more than highschool-educated investors. Of course, what matters for expected utility, is not the level of the portfolio share per se, but rather how important investing is for the optimal intertemporal allocation of life-time resources. As was motivated before, highschool-graduates have a labor income profile that induces them to save a substantial amount of wealth (because it is less steep early in life, has a sharp drop at retirement and because they face more temporary income uncertainty). They therefore stand to gain much more from investing optimally.
Another remark is important. If one thinks that investing in equities involves substantial fixed costs, e.g. informational costs, then these results do not imply that highschool graduates are more likely to bear this cost in order to gain access to financial markets. If the cost is fixed across education groups in dollar terms, college graduates might still be more inclined to paying this cost than people without a college degree even though the welfare cost of nonparticipation is relatively higher for the latter. The reason is of course that college graduates are simply wealthier so that a given dollar cost has a smaller weight for them. To the extent that the fixed information cost is decreasing in education (a reasonable assumption), stock market participation would definitely be expected to be increasing in educational attainment.
Turning to investors subject to substantially more labor income risk, 12 we find that the portfolio rule given by (16) has a very small, indeed negligible welfare cost for young investors.
This can be understood by simply comparing Figures 4a and 5 : (16) is strikingly similar to the optimal rule during the first part of the life-cycle. Of course, the fraction of the utility cost of (12) that can be attributed to the risk characteristics of labor income rises. Ignoring labor income risk becomes more costly when the investor faces more of it.
Judging from the welfare losses to young investors from following (16) in all of these cases, one might be tempted to conclude that the heuristic does fairly well: the loss is well below 1% of annual consumption. However, the lack of any dependence on preference or asset return parameters in (16) easily disproves this conclusion. The welfare losses become quite substantial when risk aversion is lowered or the equity premium increased, as in both of these cases the investor wants far more exposure to equities than prescribed by (16) . Indeed, ignoring labor income and simply following (12) does much better for the γ = 2 investor.
13
It is interesting to compare the welfare loss of implementing (15) across different values of γ. The penalty for ignoring labor income risk drops sharply as the investor becomes less risk averse. This is intuitive: the less risk-averse investor is less concerned about the risk properties of her labor income stream and is hurt less when forced to ignore those.
Finally, we consider the sensitivity of our results with respect to the time-preference parameter. A more patient investor would be expected to save more, which drives down the share invested in stocks. It is unclear what the net effect is on the dollar amount invested in equities, which is what matters for the importance of the portfolio decision and therefore for the utility loss resulting from suboptimal behavior. However, another obvious effect would be expected in terms of welfare calculations: as the future is discounted less, the losses to young investors would be expected to be larger when considering δ = 0.98. This effect clearly dominates in the last row of Table 6 .
Conclusion
In this paper we develop a quantitative and realistically calibrated model to solve numerically for the optimal consumption and portfolio decisions of a finitely-lived individual who faces labor income uncertainty and can invest in either a risky or a riskless asset. Even though labor income is risky, the optimal portfolio rules indicate that labor income is perceived as 13 To the extent that we exclude leveraging from the analysis, these welfare losses are to be interpreted as conservative lower bounds. Investors with low risk aversion or facing generous excess returns frequently find these constraints binding. When lifting the borrowing constraints, the investor would suffer even more from investing according to α = (100 − age)/100.
closer substitute for riskfree-asset holdings than for equities. Therefore the presence of labor income increases the demand for stocks, especially in midlife. In terms of the life-cycle pattern of portfolio allocation, the share invested in equities is roughly decreasing with age. This is driven by the fact that the labor income profile itself is downward sloping. When aging, labor income becomes less important and hence the implicit riskfree-asset holdings represented by it. The investor reacts optimally to this by shifting her financial portfolio towards the riskfree asset. The model was calibrated and solved for three different education groups, split according to whether the head of the household had a college degree, high school degree or no degree.
Perhaps surprisingly, the solution to the model yielded the result which one would a priori expect, namely that the average level of stockholdings is higher for college-graduates than for investors without a college degree. Surprisingly, because of the stylized nature of the model in which a given education group is characterized solely by the age at which working life begins, a given labor income profile and its risk properties.
Our results roughly support and rationalize the investment advice given by popular finance books and financial counselors, namely to shift the portfolio composition towards relatively safe assets as one ages. However the advice is quite imprecise and independent of the equity premium or of risk-aversion. This shows up in our welfare calculations: although the utility cost of following Malkiel's rule if thumb is quite small for some parametrizations, it rises as the investor becomes less risk-averse and the equity premium more generous. Considering realistic heterogeneity in investors should be an important ingredient in any discussion of optimal portfolio behavior. We also report substantial penalties for investment strategies that ignore the presence of labor income and a fortiori for not investing in equities at all.
Interestingly, we find that ignoring only labor income risk and investing according to the rule derived by Merton for an individual receiving a deterministic labor income stream, is associated with utility costs that are an order of magnitude smaller than when ignoring labor income altogether. This suggests that although labor income per se is important for optimal investment, labor income risk that is uncorrelated with stock returns is much less so.
We would like to formulate a number of qualifiers and caveats with respect to these welfare costs. First, the utility costs obtained in the paper may seem fairly small. Note however that we do allow the investor following the suboptimal rule, to consume and save optimally as our model considers utility over consumption in each period, rather than utility derived only from final wealth. With respect to our finding that ignoring labor income risk carries a minor penalty, it could be argued that the estimated zero correlation between stock market risk and labor income risk does not apply to self-employed and businessmen. Indeed Heaton and Lucas (1999a) and Davis and Willen (2000) show how these investors find equities less attractive because of the high and positive correlation between shocks to their labor income and shocks to excess returns on equities. Finally by excluding leveraged positions, the loss associated with the Malkiel rule might be understated. However, Brennan and Torous (1999) show that the welfare loss from holding unleveraged positions is quite small. Introducing leveraging is moreover not a trivial exercise as it requires careful modelling of margin calls in the event of an adverse return shock and especially of bankruptcy or default in those states of the world.
These are interesting directions for future research.
Appendix A: numerical solution
The model was solved using backward induction. In the last period the policy functions are trivial (the agent consumes all available wealth) and the value function corresponds to the indirect utility function. We can use this value function to compute the policy rules for the previous period and given these, obtain the corresponding value function. This procedure is then iterated backwards.
To avoid numerical convergence problems and in particular the danger of choosing local optima we optimized over the space of the decision variables using standard grid search. The sets of admissible values for the decision variables (consumption and portfolio allocation),
were discretized using equally spaced grids. The state-space was also discretized. We used an equally spaced grid for cash-on-hand and, following Tauchen and Hussey (1991) , approximate the density function for returns in the risky asset using Gaussian quadrature methods. The density function for both innovations to the labor income process were also approximated using Gaussian quadrature to perform the necessary numerical integration.
14 The upper and lower bounds for cash-on-hand and consumption were chosen to be non-binding in all periods.
In order to evaluate the value function corresponding to values of cash-on-hand that do not lie in the chosen grid we used a cubic spline interpolation in the log of the state variable. This interpolation has the advantage of being continuously differentiable and having a non-zero third derivative, thus preserving the prudence feature of the utility function. The support for labor income realizations is bounded away from zero due to the quadrature approximation.
Given this and the non-negativity constraint on savings, the lower bound on the grid for cash-on-hand is also strictly positive and hence the value function at each grid point is also bounded below. This fact makes the spline interpolation work quite well given a sufficiently fine discretization of the state-space.
14 The number of quadrature points used to compute the approximations for each of the density functions was set to 5, and the results were not sensitive to the choice of a higher value.
To control for education the sample was split in three groups: the observations without high school education, a second group with high school education but without a college degree, and finally college graduates. Doing so in a fixed-effects context is potentially problematic if education changes endogenously over the life-cycle. However we have only three different education groups and found few households switching from one education group to another.
Consequently we considered the household as a new entity once its education changes.
For each education group we assume that the function f(t, Z it ) is additively separable in t and Z it . The vector Z it of personal characteristics other than age and the fixed household effect, includes marital status and household composition. Household composition equals the additional number of family members in the household besides the head and (if present)
spouse. Ideally one should also control for occupation. Using PSID data this is problematic because from the 1975 wave onwards the majority of the unemployed report no occupation, and are categorized together with people who are not in the labor force. Obviously, modelling unemployment as a switch in occupation is not appropriate for our purposes as we believe that the possibility of getting laid off is one of the main sources of labor income risk.
The logarithm of labor income was then regressed on dummies for age, family and marital status, and on household composition. We used households whose head was between 20 and 65 years old (except for the third education group where the lowest age included in the sample was 22). We fit a third-order polynomial to the age dummies to obtain the labor income profiles for the numerical solution. The results are similar for a fifth-order polynomial. The income profile generated (see Tables 1 Finally, the replacement ratio λ used to determine the amount of retirement income, was calibrated as the ratio of the average of our labor income variable defined above for retirees in a given education group to the average of labor income in the last working-year prior to retirement. The result is also reported in Table 2 .
Next we estimate the error structure of the labor income process. Our procedure follows closely the variance decomposition described by Carroll and Samwick (1997) . Defining r id as
where Y * t is given by
We can then combine any two different series of r id 's to get estimates of σ Table 3 .
We use a similar procedure to estimate the correlation between labor income shocks and stock returns, ρ. The change in log(Y * it ) can be written as
Averaging across individuals (x denotes the cross-sectional sample mean of x i ) gives
The correlation coefficient is then easily computed from the OLS regression of ∆ log(Y * t ) on demeaned excess returns:
As an empirical measure for the excess return on our stylized risky asset, we use CRSP data on the New York Stock Exchange value-weighted stock return relative to the T-bill rate.
For all education groups, the regression coefficients are strikingly low and insignificant. The hypothesis of zero correlation cannot be rejected (see Table 3 ).
Appendix C: Welfare Metric
The welfare calculations are done in the form of standard consumption-equivalent variations: for each rule we compute the constant consumption stream that makes the investor as well-off in expected utility terms as the consumption stream that can be financed by the investment rule. Relative utility losses are then obtained by measuring the change in this equivalent consumption stream when deviating from the optimal rule towards the rule considered.
More precisely, we first solve the optimal consumption/savings problem for an agent who follows a rule of thumb {α
. 16 We therefore allow the investors to control the optimal wealth dynamics given an exogenous porfolio weight. Denoting the optimal consumption stream solving this constraint problem by {C
, we compute expected life-time utility from implementing {α
as follows:
where we drop the argument and time-subscript of V R 1 (X 1 ) for notational simplicity and where superscript R indexes the portfolio rule followed.
Thus, V
R represents the maximal life-time utility for someone who will use rule {α
throughout her life and is now at the beginning of adult life. Then we can convert this discounted (remaining) lifetime utility into consumption units by computing the equivalent con-
that leaves the investor indifferent between EC R and between the consumption stream attained when implementing {α
:
Therefore:
Similarly, the constant consumption stream EC * ≡ {C * } T t=1 that is equivalent in expected 16 For notational simplicity, we suppress the subscript i indexing the investor from here onwards.
utility to our optimal solution, indexed by * , is defined by:
The utility cost L R i to investor i associated with rule of thumb R is then simply computed as the percentage loss in equivalent consumption when adopting the rule of thumb rather than the optimal decision rule: .02 Mean return on stocks (µ − 1)
.06 Std. stock return (σ η ) . 1 5 7 
